App 25X

1. Still think this artifical numbering systme in the introduction ought to be abandoned in favor of the usual type of summary. If nothing else were gained, you would at least reduce unwonted emphasis on not-too-brilliant sounding points like the improbability of attempted dominance in Latin America.

Minor considerations like this could be better incorporated into a paragraph of miscellany.

Another and similar approach would combine the political and military in one very brief summary; then \mathbf{pl}_{ac} e separate xummaries before each part.

Body p. 2. This is the nub of the big argument of the other day, and

I suppose there is little that could develop in it now but an impasse, but

poisonally, I just don't find it convincing even yet. The argument, so far

as I can see, is mainly based on the word "inconceivable" which doesn't sup port

an argument. Over and above this, it says that

25X6
faced with physical

destruction would give prior consideration to ideological destruction. Well,

would they? As

eventuality as something in the remote future --- probably so. But, as

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might, under such circumstances and perhaps vaguely to their surprise,

find guite a lot of sweetness and light in the Soviet system, given proper

international cooperation and a chance of 25X6

view is watter is 179.9 off the beam, oughtn't it to be given a chance? Can

we state any more than that we believe that, even in the most stringent a

circumstances, te would never fail us and give the most cogent possible

reasons to substantiate our position?

Or, if we can't be 100% convincing on this crucial point, angle wouldn't it be better simply to admit that the 25X6 like any other people, will have to be watched?

The Near East section is better because it goes into more considerations, but a lot of it sounds practically like double-talk to me. E.G. "Nevertheless, an increasing a identity of views between the US and the state is likely to flow from the presently increased coordination, although the extent of holdings will compel the to retain a strpng voice in future joint policies regarding.

Among other tings, the ultimate question I asked last time is still unanswered if it became a question or the US or what would the do?

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From 1st dract of ORE 79-49---Technical aspects, p. 18:

"Only if we should succeed in circumventing her present tight cordon, would we expect her to dredge from her Pandora's box any new hornets."

p. 48---"Until they (certain intelligence questions) are answered, we are always in the position of "it' in Blind Man's Buff---we could just as easily pin the tail of a friend instead of a jackass."